The paper considers the properties of and relations between confounding and effect modification from the perspective of causal inference and with a distinction drawn as to how each of these two epidemiologic concepts can be defined both with respect to a distribution of potential outcomes or with respect to a specific effect measure. Both concepts are conditional on other covariates but the form this conditionality takes differs. Both concepts are also properties of the population, and both are relative to the specific exposure and to the specific outcome. For a particular population, the presence of confounding depends on how the exposure was assigned; the presence of effect modification does not. The possibility of confounding without effect modification and vice versa is discussed both with respect to distribution and measure. Discussion is given as to how confounding and effect modification relate to statistical models and to the relevance of the points made in the paper to data analysis and interpretation.
Introduction
This paper revisits the properties of and relationships between confounding and e¤ect modi…cation. The topic has of course received attention in the past (Miettinen, 1974; Greenland and Morgenstern, 1989; Geng and Li, 2002; Stürmer et al., 2006; Rothman et al., 2008) . Here, I would like to revisit it in light of insights that can be drawn from the causal inference literature and also with an eye towards a further distinction that can be drawn concerning how these two epidemiologic concepts relate both to overall distributions and to speci…c measures.
The paper describes how both confounding and e¤ect modi…cation may be de…ned so as to make reference to an entire distribution of potential outcomes or so as to reference a speci…c measure. The paper then also considers (i) the conditionality of both concepts, (ii) the relation of both concepts to study design, (iii) that both concepts are properties of the population, (iv) that both concepts are relative with respect to exposure and the outcome, (v) implications that hold between confounding and e¤ect modi…cation and (vi) the relation of both concepts to statistical models. The paper concludes by discussing a few points concerning how relations between confounding and effect modi…cation, as they relate to both distribution and measure, are relevant for data analysis and interpretation.
Notation
We will let A denote an exposure of interest, Y an outcome of interest, C a set of covariates, and Q a speci…c covariate of interest occurring prior to the exposure. We will use the notation Y a to denote the potential outcome (or "counterfactual outcome", Rubin, 1990; Hernán, 2004) for an individual if exposure A had been set, possibly contrary to fact, to value a. We assume throughout the consistency assumption that if actual exposure A = a then Y = Y a . We use the notation X ? ? Y jZ to denote that X is independent of Y conditional on Z. For simplicity we will generally assume binary treatment with A 2 f0; 1g but the remarks here are applicable more generally. The average causal e¤ect for a population is then denoted by E(Y 1 Y 0 ). Some of the early literature in epidemiology placed emphasis on the e¤ect of exposure on the exposed, i.e. E(Y 1 Y 0 jA = 1). There has been more recent emphasis on average causal e¤ect, E(Y 1 Y 0 ), but which of the two is of interest will vary by context.
Confounding: Distribution and Measure
The basic notion of exchangeability or "no confounding" is that the outcomes observed amongst the unexposed (or exposed) are representative of what would have been observed had the exposed been unexposed (or had the unexposed been exposed). If the outcomes observed amongst the unexposed are representative of what would have been observed if the exposed had been unexposed, then the group are e¤ectively "exchangeable"; there is no confounding. If the exposed and unexposed are not comparable in this way then confounding is said to be present. Some of the epidemiologic literature uses the terms "no confounding" and "exchangeability" interchangeably but sometimes a distinction is drawn between the two with only the latter denoting also the absence of selection bias (and possibly measurement error). In the absence of selection bias and measurement error, the two could be taken as equivalent.
This general notion of confounding or exchangeability can be de…ned both with respect to the distribution of potential outcomes and with respect to a speci…c measure. The distinction has been drawn before (Greenland et al., 1999) . De…nition 1. We say that there is no confounding in distribution of the e¤ect of A on Y conditional on C if P (Y a jC = c) = P (Y jA = a; C = c) for all a; c.
De…nition 1 states that within strata of C, the group that actually had exposure status A = a is representative of what would have occurred had the entire population with C = c been given exposure A = a. If this holds, we could use the observed data to reason about the e¤ect of intervening to set A = a for the entire population. If the conditions of De…nition 1 are not satis…ed, we will say that there is confounding in distribution (conditional on C). In this paper, we will use the expressions, "no confounding in distribution" and "unconfounded in distribution" interchangeably. The condition in De…nition 1 is sometimes also referred to as "weak ignorability" or "ignorable treatment assignment" (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) , "exchangeability" (Greenland and Robins, 1986) , "no unmeasured confounding" (Robins, 1992) , "selection on observables" (Barnow et al., 1980; Imbens, 2004) , or "exogeneity" (Imbens, 2004) . The condition in De…nition 1 is often written in terms of a conditional independence assumption, namely, Y a ? ? AjC. This can also be written as P (Y a jA = 1; C = c) = P (Y a jA = 0; C = c) = P (Y a jC = c) indicating that, conditional on C, the exposed and unexposed groups are comparable in their potential outcomes.
A further distinction can be drawn between confounding "in expectation" and "realized" confounding (Fisher, 1935; Rothman, 1977; Greenland, 1990; Greenland et al., 1999) . In a randomized trial the groups receiving the placebo and the treatment will be comparable in their potential outcomes on average over repeated experiments. However, for any given experiment, the particular randomization may result in chance imbalances due to the particular allocation. Such a scenario would be one in which there is no confounding "in expectation" but there is realized confounding for the particular experiment (conditional on the allocation). Some authors (Greenland et al., 1999; Greenland and Robins, 2009) prefer to restrict the use of "no confounding" to that that is realized; a number of authors (e.g. Rubin, 1991; Robins, 1992; Stone, 1993) use terms like "no confounding" to refer to that in expectation; here we will adopt the latter practice. See Greenland and Robins (2009) for further discussion.
Note that De…nition 1 makes reference to the whole distribution of potential outcomes, P (Y a jC = c) = P (Y jA = a; C = c). In some of the earlier causal inference literature (Greenland and Robins, 1986) , confounding and exchangeability were discussed not in terms of distributions of potential outcomes but principally in terms of mean di¤erences of potential outcomes. This gives rise to the notion of confounding in measure (Greenland et al., 1999) . We will denote measures of interest by where (p 1 ; p 2 ) is a function of two population parameters. Common measures in epidemiologic research include the risk di¤erence (p 1 ; p 2 ) = p 1 p 2 , the risk ratio, (p 1 ; p 2 ) = p 1 =p 2 and the odds ratio, (p 1 ; p 2 ) = p 1 (1 p 1 )=fp 2 (1 p 2 )g. De…nition 2. We say that there is no confounding in measure of the e¤ect of
Whereas De…nition 1 requires that an entire distribution of potential outcomes be comparable, De…nition 2 makes reference to a speci…c measure. For example, with the risk di¤erence measure
This may hold without De…nition 1 holding for either of two reasons. First, if the outcome is not binary, then it is possible that the mean potential outcomes in the exposed and unexposed are equal even though their distributions are not. For example, it may be the case that the mean potential outcome Y 0 is comparable in the exposed and unexposed, i.e. E(Y 0 jA = 1; C = c) = E(Y 0 jA = 0; C = c), even though the distributions P (Y 0 jA = 1; C = c) and P (Y 0 jA = 0; C = c) are di¤erent (as might occur if the distribution of Y 0 was more disperse for the exposed than the unexposed). Second, it is possible that even if it is not the case that E(Y 1 jC = c) = E(Y jA = 1; C = c) and E(Y 0 jC = c) = E(Y jA = 0; C = c), it may be that the bias for E(Y 1 jC = c) and for E(Y 0 jC = c) e¤ectively cancel one another out so that the associational risk di¤erence, E(Y jA = 1; C = c) E(Y jA = 0; C = c), is in fact equal to the causal risk di¤erence, E(Y 1 jC = c) E(Y 0 jC = c). In other words, there is no confounding for the risk di¤erence measure. Such cases would probably be quite rare in practice.
This second possibility also indicates that there can be confounding for one measure but not another. If E(Y 1 ) = 0:4, E(Y 0 ) = 0:2, E(Y jA = 1) = 0:3, E(Y jA = 0) = 0:1 then E(Y 1 ) E(Y 0 ) = 0:4 0:2 = 0:2 and E(Y jA = 1) E(Y jA = 0) = 0:3 0:1 = 0:2 so we would have no confounding for the risk di¤erence measure but E(Y 1 )=E(Y 0 ) = 0:4=0:2 = 2 and E(Y jA = 1)=E(Y jA = 0) = 0:3=0:1 = 3 so we would have confounding for the risk ratio measure.
In some of the earlier literature, often the assumption was only made that the mean outcome of unexposed was representative of what would have been observed if the exposed had been unexposed i.e. only E(Y 0 jA = 1; C = c) = E(Y 0 jA = 0; C = c). This would allow one to estimate the e¤ect of the exposure on the exposure, E(Y 1 Y 0 jA = 1) but not the average causal e¤ect, E(Y 1 Y 0 ). Requiring that E(Y a jA = 1; C = c) = E(Y a jA = 0; C = c) for only one value of a is sometimes referred to as an assumption of "partial exchangeability" (Greenland and Robins, 1986 ).
The de…nition above de…nes confounding in measure as the equality of an associational and causal measure. It is important to note that, in data analysis, to get a valid estimate, one must also use an estimator of E(Y jA = a; C = c) that is consistent. If C is multivariate this can be a di¢ cult modeling task.
De…nition 2 concerns conditional measures; one might also consider marginal or standardized measure. If is a standardized measure then there is no confounding in measure of the marginal e¤ect of A on Y adjusting for
. Similar de…nitions could be given for the marginal e¤ect on the exposed or unexposed i.e.
. If the exposure groups are exchangeable in that E(Y a jA = 1; C = c) = E(Y a jA = 0; C = c) for all a and c then the e¤ect of A on Y will be unconfounded for both the conditional and marginal measures. With conditional measures, there may be no confounding for the measure for some strata of C but not for others. Likewise, for standardized measures, there may be no confounding for one standardized measure but not another; for example, if the e¤ect of A on Y is unconfounded in distribution conditional on C and C has an e¤ect on the outcome only in the presence of exposure, then there will be no confounding for (E(Y 1 jA = a 1 ); E(Y 0 jA = a 1 )) without controlling for C but there will in general be confounding for (E(Y 1 ); E(Y 0 )) if control is not made for C.
In the examples above, we have seen that the e¤ect of A on Y may be unconfounded for a speci…c measure but not in distribution. De…nitions 1 and 2 are nevertheless related by the following proposition. Proposition 1. If Y is binary, then there is confounding in distribution if and only if there is some measure for which there is confounding in measure .
Proposition 1 need not hold true if Y is not binary because of the possibility that the mean, but not the distribution, of potential outcomes in the exposed and unexposed are equal. An immediate corollary of Proposition 1 is that if the e¤ect of A on Y is unconfounded in distribution then it will be unconfounded for all measures . This implication holds true also if Y is not binary. De…nition 1 is the more stringent and more general de…nition.
Confounding in distribution is sometimes assessed using causal diagrams and in some of the examples in subsequent sections, we will make use of such causal diagrams (Pearl, 1995 (Pearl, , 2009 ). An introduction to causal diagrams can be found elsewhere (Pearl, 1995 (Pearl, , 2009 Glymour and Greenland, 2008 ). An important result that we will draw upon here is that if the causal diagram is such that all common causes of any two variables on the graph are also on the graph then Pearl's backdoor path theorem applies (Pearl, 1995) . A backdoor path from a variable A to another variable Y is a sequence of consecutive edges that begins with an edge pointing into A. Pearl's backdoor path theorem can be stated as follows: if a set of variables C that are not e¤ects of A blocks all backdoor paths from A to Y then Y a ? ? AjC for all a. See Pearl (1995 Pearl ( , 2009 or Glymour and Greenland (2008) for formal de…nitions of blocked paths and other related concepts. Essentially, if C satis…es this backdoor path criterion then the e¤ect of A on Y is unconfounded in distribution conditional on C. When unmeasured confounding is present its in ‡uence can sometimes be assessed through sensitivity analysis (Schlesselman, 1978; Rothman et al. 2008; Lash et al., 2009; VanderWeele and Arah, 2011) or reasoning about the sign of the bias (VanderWeele, 2008; VanderWeele and Robins, 2010) .
E¤ect Modi…cation: Distribution and Measure
We have seen that a distinction can be drawn between confounding in distribution and confounding in measure. A similar distinction can in fact also be drawn with regard to e¤ect modi…cation as the following two de…nitions make clear.
De…nition 3. We say that there is e¤ect modi…cation in distribution across strata of Q for the e¤ect of A on Y if P (Y a jQ = q) varies with q.
De…nition 4. We say that there is e¤ect modi…cation in measure across strata of Q for the e¤ect of A on Y if (E(Y 1 jQ = q); E(Y 0 jQ = q)) varies with q.
De…nition 3 considers di¤erent subpopulations de…ned by their level of some variable Q and considers what would happen if treatment for all individuals were set to level a. It e¤ectively asks whether the distribution of the outcome Y a would be comparable across di¤erent strata of Q. If not then e¤ect modi…cation in distribution is said to be present. De…nition 4, concerning e¤ect modi…cation "in measure," is the de…nition more commonly employed in the epidemiologic literature. With de…nition 4, e¤ect modi…cation is said to be present in measure if the e¤ect of the exposure using measure (e.g. the risk di¤erence, risk ratio, or odds ratio scale) varies across strata of Q. De…nition 4 is the de…nition that is generally considered when e¤ect modi…cation is in view. De…nition 3 concerning e¤ect modi…cation in distribution helps to see the parallel with confounding in distribution, but, a little re ‡ection makes clear that De…nition 3 concerning e¤ect modi…cation in distribution is a fairly trivial concept insofar as if Q has any e¤ect whatsoever on Y then there will in general be e¤ect modi…cation in distribution (even if the exposure A has no e¤ect on the outcome). We do not advocate the use of De…nition 3 in practice but employ it in this paper simply so as to draw the appropriate parallels and distinctions with confounding.
More recently, the expression "e¤ect-measure modi…cation" (Rothman, 2002; Brumback and Berg, 2008) has been used in place of the expression, "effect modi…cation." This has arguably occurred for two reasons. First, as has often been pointed out (Miettinen, 1974; Rothman, 2002; Brumback and Berg, 2008; Rothman et al., 2008) , there may be e¤ect modi…cation for one measure (e.g. the risk di¤erence) but not for another (e.g. the risk ratio). E¤ect modi…cation in measure is thus scale-dependent and the expression "e¤ect-measure modi…cation" makes this more explicit. Second, with observational data, control for confounding is often inadequate; the quantities we estimate from data may not re ‡ect true causal e¤ects. The expression "e¤ect-measure modi…cation" suggests only that our measures (which may not re ‡ect causal e¤ects) vary across strata of Q, rather than the e¤ects themselves (which we may not be able to consistently estimate).
If the e¤ect of A on Y is unconfounded in distribution conditional on C with Q a subset of C then P (Y a jQ = q) = X c P (Y jA = a; C = c)P (Q = qjC = c) and one can then assess e¤ect modi…cation in distribution by assessing whether this quantity varies with q. If e¤ect of A on Y is unconfounded in distribution conditional on C so that E(Y a jA = 1; C = c) = E(Y a jA = 0; C = c) for all a and c, then one can assess e¤ect modi…cation in measure by assessing whether (
In the de…nition of e¤ect modi…cation given above, we considered whether the e¤ect of an exposure on an outcome varies across strata de…ned by another variable. This is arguably how the term "e¤ect modi…cation" has traditionally been used within epidemiology. However, a distinction should be drawn between this setting and one in which interventions on both factor, e.g. on both A and Q, are considered. When interventions on two factors are considered (rather than interventions on one factor assessed across strata de…ned by another factor), the resulting measures might be better referred to as measures of "causal interaction." The distinction has important implications for confounding control -whether confounding for one or two factors needs to be controlled for -and is considered in greater detail elsewhere (VanderWeele 2009a; VanderWeele and Knol, 2011) . Here our focus will be on "e¤ect modi…cation"/"e¤ect heterogeneity" rather than "causal interaction." For e¤ect modi…cation/e¤ect heterogeneity, the secondary factor (i.e. the "e¤ect modi…er") may or may not itself have a causal e¤ect on the outcome; it may serve as a proxy for a variable that does. For causal interaction the secondary factor must have an e¤ect on the outcome. It should be noted that some authors suggest refraining from the use of "e¤ect modi…er" for a variable that does not itself have a causal e¤ect on the outcome (Shahar and Shahar, 2010; cf. VanderWeele, 2010) . The term "e¤ect heterogeneity" may better capture the notion that an e¤ect varies across strata de…ned by another variable. Here, however, we will retain the traditional use of the term "e¤ect modi…cation" or the more recent variant "e¤ect-measure modi…cation" (Rothman, 2002; Brumback and Berg, 2008) for the phenomenon of an e¤ect varying across strata of another variable.
As with De…nitions 1 and 2, De…nitions 3 and 4 are also related as indicated by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If Y is binary then there is e¤ect modi…cation in distribution across strata of Q if and only if there exists a measure such that there is e¤ect modi…cation in measure across strata of Q.
That e¤ect modi…cation in measure implies e¤ect modi…cation in distribution holds for arbitrary Y but the reverse implication requires binary Y .
Note that with observational data, neither statements about confounding nor about e¤ect modi…cation can be de…nitively veri…ed. The de…nitions for confounding and e¤ect modi…cation in either distribution or measure are statements about counterfactual outcomes; because we do not observe the potential outcomes for each individual under the two di¤erent exposure states, we cannot check these conditions. At best we can attempt to collect data on a su¢ ciently rich set of covariates C such that the assumption of no confounding (in distribution or measure) is thought reasonable, conditional on C. Under this assumption we can then assess e¤ect modi…cation.
In a study in which A is randomized the e¤ect of A on Y will be unconfounded (in distribution and measure) both unconditionally and conditional on any set of pre-randomization covariates C. In a randomized study, we can thus also consistently estimate measures of e¤ect modi…cation. Note that even though the secondary factor Q is not randomized, e¤ect modi…cation, as de…ned in De…nitions 3 and 4, concerns whether the e¤ect of A on Y varies across strata of Q. This need not indicate a causal e¤ect of Q itself on Y ; Q may be serving as a proxy for another variable that has a causal e¤ect on Y (VanderWeele, 2009a (VanderWeele, , 2010 .
In many de…nitions of confounding and e¤ect modi…cation, e¤ect modi…cation is taken as scale-dependent and confounding as being scale-independent. We have seen in this section, however, that there are analogues between confounding and e¤ect modi…cation for both distribution and measure. Although confounding is often taken as confounding in distribution (De…nition 1) and is thus scale-independent, De…nition 2 for confounding in measure makes reference to a particular measure and is thus scale-dependent. Likewise although e¤ect modi…cation is often taken as e¤ect modi…cation in measure (De…nition 4) and is thus scale-dependent, De…nition 3 for e¤ect modi…cation in distribution does not make reference to a particular measure; it is scale independent. In subsequent sections we will consider other similarities and di¤erences in properties of confounding and e¤ect modi…cation. We will discuss how while confounding depends on how the exposure was assigned, e¤ect modi…cation does not. Likewise, we will see that although confounding and e¤ect modi…cation are both relative to other variables being conditioned on, and to the population, and to the exposure and outcome of interest, the ways in which confounding and e¤ect modi…cation are relative to these di¤erent factors varies.
Conditionality of Confounding and E¤ect Modi…cation
Both confounding (in distribution and measure) and e¤ect modi…cation (in distribution and measure) are dependent on what other variables are being conditioned upon (Miettinen, 1974; Rothman et al., 2008; VanderWeele, 2009b ). We will consider confounding and e¤ect modi…cation in turn.
Conditional on X, an additional variable C clearly assists in confounding control if Y a ? ? Aj(C; X) but it is not the case that Y a ? ? AjX i.e. if the e¤ect of A on Y is unconfounded in distribution conditional on (C; X) but not conditional on X. If this is the case we will say that C is a confounder in distribution (conditional on X). Whether a variable assists in confounding control will depend on the other variables for which control is made. In the causal diagram in Figure 1 for instance, C 1 blocks all backdoor paths from A to Y and thus Y a ? ? AjC 1 . Fig. 1 . Diagram illustrating that confounding is relative to the other variables for which control is made.
The variable C 1 thus unconditionally assists in confounding control. However, conditional on C 2 , control for C 1 is irrelevant. The e¤ect of A on Y is unconfounded in distribution conditional on C 2 or (C 1 ; C 2 ). Conditional on C 2 , the variable C 1 does not assist in confounding control. Conversely, in Figure 2 , C 1 does not unconditionally assist in confounding control. The e¤ect of A on Y is unconfounded when conditioning on nothing or when conditioning on C 1 . However, conditional on C 2 (e.g. if we wanted to compute e¤ect measures within strata of C 2 ), C 1 does assist in confounding control. The e¤ect of A on Y is unconfounded in distribution conditional on (C 1 ; C 2 ) but not conditional on C 2 alone because of what is sometimes called "collider strati…cation" or "M-bias" (Greenland, 2003; Cole et al., 2010) . Likewise e¤ect modi…cation is dependent on the other variables being conditioned upon. We could say that there is e¤ect modi…cation in distribution across strata of Q for the e¤ect of A on Y conditional on C if P (Y a jQ = q; C = c) varies with q and that there is e¤ect modi…cation in measure across strata of Q for the e¤ect of A on Y conditional on C if (E(Y 1 jQ = q; C = c); E(Y 0 jQ = q; C = c)) varies with q. On a causal diagram, a necessary condition for Q to serve as an e¤ect modi…er (in distribution or measure) for the e¤ect of A on Y conditional on C is that Q be associated with the parents of Y (other than A) conditional on C (VanderWeele and Robins, 2007) .
We give two further diagrams to illustrate the conditionality of e¤ect modi…cation. In Figure 3 , Q may be an e¤ect modi…er (in distribution or measure) for the e¤ect of A on Y unconditionally because it serves as a proxy for C 1 which might interact with A in its e¤ects on Y . However, conditional on C 1 , Q will no longer be an e¤ect modi…er (in distribution or measure) for the e¤ect of A on Y . Conversely in Figure 4 , Q is not an e¤ect modi…er (in distribution or measure) unconditionally but may be an e¤ect modi…er for the e¤ect of A on Y conditional on C 1 (VanderWeele and Robins, 2007) . Note that although confounding and e¤ect modi…cation are both clearly relative to what other variables are being conditioned upon, they are relative in di¤erent ways. In Figure 1 , C 1 no longer assists with confounding control when conditioning on C 2 . However, C 1 may still be an e¤ect modi…er conditional on C 2 . In Figure 3 , whether Q is an e¤ect modi…er for the e¤ect of A on Y depends on whether or not we are conditioning on C; however, irrespective of whether or not we are conditioning on C, Q will not assist in control of confounding for the e¤ect of A on Y . The e¤ect of A on Y is unconfounded irrespective or whether or not we control for Q (or for C).
In the appendix, to illustrate the conditionality of confounding and effect modi…cation further, we show that it is always possible to hypothetically construct a single variable E such that there is no further confounding conditional on that variable and that it is also possible to hypothetically construct a variable S such that no other variable serves as an e¤ect modi…er conditional on S.
Relation to Study Design
For a …xed population and exposure and outcome, whether another variable is a confounder or assists in confounding control depends on how the treatment or exposure was administered. A variable may be a confounder for an exposureoutcome relationship in an observational study, but would not be a confounder if a randomized trial for the e¤ect of the exposure had been conducted in the same population. For example, an observational study by Charig et al. (1986) compared open surgery with percutaneous nephrolithotomy in the treatment of kidney stones. Individuals with open surgery had larger stones on average. The di¤erence in cure rates adjusted for kidney stone size was in fact in the opposite direction of the crude di¤erence in cure rates. In the study, kidney stone size confounded the e¤ect of treatment on the rate of cure. Had the same population been used but if the study design had actually been one in which the treatments were randomized (rather than an observational study) then kidney stone size would no longer have been a confounder in the study. Whether kidney stone size is a confounder for the study thus depends on the study design and is not an intrinsic property of a variable. As will be seen below confounding is also relative to the population, the exposure and the outcome.
For a …xed population and exposure and outcome, e¤ect modi…cation does not depend on how the exposure or treatment was administered. This di¤erence between confounding and e¤ect modi…cation can also be seen by the de…nitions given above for confounding and e¤ect modi…cation. The definitions for confounding depend on the distribution of the exposure A in the population (and the distribution of A will depend on whether or not exposure was randomized in a balanced manner). The de…nitions for e¤ect modi…cation do not make reference to the distribution of the exposure A, only to the distribution of potential outcomes Y a , which is essentially viewed as a …xed feature of the population in question. The presence of e¤ect modi…cation does not depend on whether the exposure is randomized. In the Charig et al. (1986) study, the investigators also found a larger e¤ect on the risk di¤erence scale comparing open surgery with percutaneous nephrolithotomy for those with smaller kidney stones than those with larger kidney stones. Let us assume that the estimates within strata of kidney stone size obtained by Charig et al. (1986) from observational data accurately re ‡ect the true causal e¤ects, then kidney stone size is an e¤ect modi…er for the risk di¤erence measure comparing the two treatments. Suppose now that with the same population treatment had been randomized, the e¤ects comparing open surgery with percutaneous nephrolithotomy by kidney stone size would remain the same (assuming there was no confounding in the observational study conditional on kidney stone size) and once again kidney stone size would be an e¤ect modi…er for the risk di¤erence measure. Although e¤ect modi…cation does not depend on how treatment was assigned, it is, as noted above, relative to the other variables being conditioned upon and is also, as noted below, relative to the population, the exposure and the outcome.
Relativity of Confounding and E¤ect Modi…cation to Population
Confounding depends on how treatment was assigned; e¤ect modi…cation does not. Both are however relative to a population. A variable might serve as a confounder for a cohort design of one population but not serve as a confounder for a cohort design of another population. This may be because the potential confounder is related to the exposure in one population but not in another; or it may be because the potential confounder is related to the outcome in one population but not in another. For example, Kwok et al. (2010) noted that in observational studies of breast feeding in western countries, higher socioeconomic status both increased the likelihood of breastfeeding and decreased the likelihood of having an obese child; however, in a study in Hong Kong, lower socioeconomic status increased the likelihood of breast-feeding but was not as clearly related to obesity in children. In examining the e¤ects of breastfeeding on obesity in children, socioeconomic status would thus likely be a confounder in the western studies but perhaps not in the study in Hong Kong. Interestingly, a randomized trial on breastfeeding promotion (Kramer et al., 2007) found an e¤ect of breastfeeding on IQ but not on obesity; the studies of breastfeeding in western countries (perhaps subject to confounding by SES) suggested an e¤ect of breastfeeding on both childhood obesity and IQ whereas the study in Hong Kong (where confounding by SES was less likely an issue) indicated an e¤ect only for IQ.
E¤ect modi…cation is, like confounding, relative to a population. For example, suppose Q modi…es the risk di¤erence for the e¤ect of A but that it is also the case that A only has an e¤ect in the presence of some genetic factor G = 1 i.e. there is no e¤ect of A if G = 0. Suppose that in population 1, some individuals have the genetic factor (G = 1) but that the genetic factor is entirely absent in population 2. Then Q might serve as an e¤ect modi…er for the risk di¤erence for A in population 1 but it would not in population 2 since the e¤ect of A in population 2 would be 0 for all levels of Q. Said another way, the prevalence of factors other than the exposure A and the potential e¤ect modi…er Q, may di¤er across populations. This point was also illustrated in a very succinct manner by Rothman using su¢ cient-component cause diagrams (Rothman, 1976) .
That e¤ect modi…cation is relative to the population also points to the fact that population itself can also serve as an e¤ect modi…er. Population is clearly an e¤ect modi…er for the exposure A in the hypothetical example with the gene just given. Also in the breast-feeding example, it is possible that the e¤ects of breast-feeding in Hong Kong and in western countries are in fact di¤erent. Kwok et al. (2010) notes that breastfed infants are more likely to be given glucose drinks in Hong Kong; this might interact with the e¤ects of breastfeeding on obesity, e¤ectively cancelling them out.
Relativity of Confounding and E¤ect Modi…cation to Both Exposure and Outcome
From De…nitions 1-4, we see that both confounding and e¤ect modi…cation make reference to a speci…c exposure and a speci…c outcome. A variable is not simply a confounder (or an e¤ect modi…er) for a treatment nor is it simply a confounder (or e¤ect modi…er) for an outcome. Rather it will be or not be a confounder (or e¤ect modi…er) for a speci…c exposure-outcome relationship. Whether a variable is a confounder for a speci…c exposure is relative to the particular outcome. In the causal diagram in Figure 5 , C 1 is a confounder for the e¤ect of A on Y ; however it is not a confounder for the e¤ect of A on V . Again, a variable is a confounder for a speci…c exposure-outcome relationship not simply for a speci…c exposure. Fig. 5 . Diagram illustrating that confounding is relative to the exposure and to the outcome: C 1 is a confounder for the e¤ect of A on Y; however it is not a confounder for the e¤ect of A on V; C 2 is a confounder for the e¤ect of V on Y; however it is not a confounder for the e¤ect of A on Y.
Likewise, whether a variable is a confounder for a speci…c outcome is relative to the particular exposure. In Figure 5 , C 2 is a confounder for the e¤ect of V on Y ; however it is not a confounder for the e¤ect of A on Y ; control for C 2 would not be necessary if the e¤ect of A on Y were of interest. We see a variable is a confounder not simply for a speci…c outcome but for a speci…c exposure-outcome relationship. Similarly, a variable is an e¤ect modi…er for a speci…c exposure-outcome relationship not simply for a speci…c exposure. In the causal diagram in Figure  6 , Q may serve as an e¤ect modi…er for the e¤ect of A on Y ; however, in Figure  6 , Q cannot serve as an e¤ect modi…er of the e¤ect of A on V (VanderWeele and Robins, 2007) . We see then from Figure 6 that whether a variable is an e¤ect modi…er is relative to the particular outcome. Likewise, a variable is an e¤ect modi…er for a speci…c exposure-outcome relationship not simply for a speci…c outcome. In the causal diagram in Figure 7 , Q may serve as an e¤ect modi…er for the e¤ect of A on Y if A and Q interact in their e¤ects on Y ; however, in Figure 7 , Q cannot serve as an e¤ect modi…er of the e¤ect of V on Y (VanderWeele and Robins, 2007) . We see then from Figure 7 that whether a variable is an e¤ect modi…er is relative to the particular exposure. 
Relations Between Confounding and E¤ect Modi…cation: Distribution and Measure
A variable may be an e¤ect modi…er without being a confounder as occurs with subgroup analyses in randomized trials. We saw this also in Figure  3 . In fact Figure 3 su¢ ces to demonstrate that a variable can be an e¤ect modi…er in distribution for the e¤ect of A on Y without it being a confounder in distribution and also that a variable can be an e¤ect modi…er for measure without it being a confounder for measure . Likewise, it has been noted previously (Miettinen, 1974; Fisher and Patil, 1974; Greenland and Morgenstern, 1989; Rothman et al., 2008 ) that a variable can be a confounder for measure (and thus also a confounder in distribution) without it being an e¤ect modi…er for measure . To see this suppose that The question remains, however, whether a variable may be a confounder in distribution without it being an e¤ect modi…er in distribution. The following proposition answers this question negatively.
Proposition 3. If Y a ? ? Aj(C; X) but it is not the case that Y a ? ? AjX then C must be an e¤ect modi…er in distribution for the e¤ect of A on Y conditional on X.
Proposition 3 essentially states that if C is a confounder conditional on X (so that the e¤ect of A on Y is unconfounded in distribution conditional on (C; X) but not conditional on X alone) then C must be an e¤ect modi…er in distribution for the e¤ect of A on Y conditional on X. Thus while a variable can be a confounder in measure but not an e¤ect modi…er in measure, or can be an e¤ect modi…er in measure but not a confounder in measure, or an e¤ect modi…er in distribution but not a confounder in distribution, a variable that is a confounder in distribution must also be an e¤ect modi…er in distribution.
Confounding and E¤ect Modi…cation in Models
Confounding and e¤ect modi…cation, as conceived in this paper, and in much of modern epidemiology are causal concepts: they relate to the distribution of counterfactual variables. In practice, however, statistical models are often used to reason about the presence or absence of confounding and e¤ect modi…cation.
To assess whether an additional variable C is a confounder for the e¤ect of an exposure A on an outcome Y when already controlling for covariates X, an investigator will often …t the two models:
where g is a link function, and will examine whether 1 is equal to 1 . If they are equal, then often C is discarded as a confounder. Although this approach will in some settings give valid results (Greenland et al. 1999; VanderWeele and Shpitser, 2011) , several caveats are important. First, the procedure assumes that the set of variables (X; C) with which one begins su¢ ces to control for confounding for the e¤ect of A on Y , at least for the measure corresponding to the link function g e.g. for a di¤erence measure if g is the identity link. If the original set (X; C) does not su¢ ce to control for confounding it may be the case that 1 and 1 are equal but that if a su¢ cient set of confounders were included in the model, the coe¢ cients in models with and without C would di¤er. Backwards selection techniques, as are often used in practice by iteratively applying the procedure above, will in general only be valid if the original set of covariates considered itself su¢ ces to control for confounding (VanderWeele and Shpitser, 2011) .
A second and perhaps even more important and neglected caveat is that although the change-in-coe¢ cient procedure above will, provided (X; C) su¢ ces to control for confounding, be valid for di¤erence and risk ratio measures, it fails for logistic regression and odds ratio measures (Greenland et al., 1999) . This is because the odds ratio is not a collapsible measure: even if C is not a confounder (or if the exposure A is randomized so there is no confounding), controlling for an additional covariate C will in general change the odds ratio (Greenland et al., 1999) . If the exposure is randomized, controlling for more and more covariates will in general increase the odds ratio measure (Robinson and Jewell, 1991) . The change-in-coe¢ cient procedure should not be used for logistic regression unless the outcome is rare in which case odds ratios approximate risk ratios and the procedure may thus apply approximately (Greenland et al., 1999) . Third, if the set (X; C) does not su¢ ce to control for confounding, a change in coe¢ cients may occur in settings in which absence of control for a pre-exposure covariate yields an unbiased estimate but control for the covariate does not. This occurs in settings with collider strati…cation such as the variable C 2 in Figure 2 . Controlling for C 2 versus no covariates would in general change the regression coe¢ cient for A, but it would be the estimate without controlling for C 2 that would be unbiased. A change in coe¢ cient would not in such settings indicate that control should be made for the covariate. Fourth, even when the change-in-coe¢ cient procedure is valid, when it is actually applied, what is being compared in practice is coe¢ cient estimates rather than the true coe¢ cients and thus the approach is subject to error due to sampling variability. Decisions about confounder control are in general best made on substantive rather than statistical grounds. Finally, even in settings in which the change-in-coe¢ cient procedure yields valid conclusions, the conclusions concern confounding in the measure for the scale corresponding to link function g. As noted in previous sections, a change in scale may alter whether a variable is a confounder in measure.
To assess whether a variable Q is an e¤ect modi…er for the e¤ect of an and assess whether the coe¢ cient, 4 , for the product term is non-zero. Provided that the model is correctly speci…ed and that (X; Q) su¢ ces to control for confounding of the e¤ect of A on Y , 4 will provided a measure of e¤ect modi…cation of the e¤ect of A on Y conditional on X for the measure corresponding to the link function g. However, as noted in previous sections, the presence or absence of e¤ect modi…cation on one scale does not imply the presence or absence of e¤ect modi…cation for another. This approach of examining the coe¢ cient for the product term relates to e¤ect modi…cation in measure. For e¤ect modi…cation in distribution, if either 3 or 4 are non-zero then there will be e¤ect modi…cation in distribution in so far as the distribution of counterfactual outcomes Y a , conditional on (X; Q), will vary across strata of Q. As noted above, however, e¤ect modi…cation in distribution is a very weak notion of e¤ect modi…cation; it may be present even if A has no e¤ect on Y at all. It is sometimes commented that if a variable is an e¤ect modi…er, we no longer are concerned whether it is a confounder. Such comments arguably arise from treating confounding and e¤ect modi…cation as statistical concepts rather than causal concepts (i.e. not making reference to counterfactuals). If confounding is de…ned, rather than merely assessed, by the change-in-coe¢ cient method, then once we …t the model above for e¤ect modi…cation, including the interaction term 4 aq, we no longer have a single coe¢ cient for A. Rather we have two, namely, 1 and 4 , and so it seems that the change-in-coe¢ cient method to assess confounding breaks down. However, in observational studies, whether a variable is a confounder is always a concern, regardless of whether it is an e¤ect modi…er, or of whether we are interested in assessing e¤ect modi…cation. Depending on the context, e¤ect modi…cation may or may not be of intrinsic interest. Often we will be interested in e¤ect modi…cation in order to target populations in which some intervention will be most e¤ective. However, in other contexts concerning policy decisions which may result in either the entire population being exposed or unexposed, the overall treatment e¤ect, rather than e¤ect modi…cation measures, may be what is most important. Even when assessing the overall treatment e¤ect is the primary study goal, product terms may have to be included in statistical models to yield accurate estimates of the overall e¤ect; one may have to average over the distribution of e¤ect modi…ers to estimate the overall treatment e¤ect; assessing e¤ect modi…-cation itself may then not be what is of central interest. Confounding is always a concern in observational research; we should be concerned if a variable is a confounder even when it is an e¤ect modi…er.
It should …nally be noted that more recently, instead of using regression models to estimate e¤ects, marginal structural model, …t using an inverse probability of treatment weighting (IPTW) are now often being employed. One of the conceptual advantages of the marginal structural model approach is that it more clearly distinguishes the analytic procedures for handling confounding and e¤ect modi…cation (Robins et al., 2000) . Suppose we have data on exposure A, outcome Y and covariates (X; Q). A marginal structural model for the overall e¤ect of A on Y takes the form:
The parameters of the marginal structural model can be estimated by …tting a conditional regression model:
where each subject i is weighted by the inverse probability of treatment weight
where a i , x i , and q i are the actual values of A, X, and Q for subject i. Provided (X; Q) su¢ ces to control for confounding for the e¤ect of A on Y , this inverse probability of treatment weight procedure for the conditional model gfE[Y jA = a]g = 0 + 1 a will give consistent estimators of the parameters of the marginal structural model. Control for confounding is made, not by covariate adjustment as in regression, but by weighting. The weights themselves, w i , may be estimated by modeling both the numerator and denominator probabilities using logistic regression. Provided the models for these probabilities are correctly speci…ed, the procedure will still yield consistent estimators of the marginal structural model even if the estimated weights, rather than the true weights, are used (Robins et al., 2000) .
On the other hand, if e¤ect modi…cation is of interest, one may use a marginal structural model of the form:
Note that 3 in this marginal structural model gives a measure of e¤ect modi…cation that is marginalized over X rather than conditional on X as in the regression based approach above. The parameters of the marginal structural model for e¤ect modi…cation can be estimated by …tting a conditional regression model:
where a i , x i , and q i are again the actual values of A, X, and Q for subject i. Provided (X; Q) su¢ ces to control for confounding for the e¤ect of A on Y , this inverse probability of treatment weighting procedure for the conditional model gfE[Y jA = a; Q = q]g = 0 + 1 a + 2 q + 3 aq will give consistent estimators of the parameters of the marginal structural model for e¤ect modi…cation. Using the marginal structural model / IPTW approach, the distinction between confounding and e¤ect modi…cation is made clear in the analytic procedure itself insofar as the model that is …t and the weights that are used are both di¤erent in the procedures used for confounding control versus e¤ect modi…cation assessment. See Robins et al. (2000) for further details on …tting marginal structural models. Finally, it should be noted that the marginal structural models used for assessing e¤ect modi…cation are di¤erent from those assessing causal interaction i.e. when assessing the e¤ects of interventions on two exposures, rather than interventions on one exposure within strata of another factor; for causal interaction there are two sets of confounding variables and two sets of weights are used (VanderWeele, 2009) .
Discussion
This paper has considered the properties of and relationships between confounding and e¤ect modi…cation. We have seen that both confounding and e¤ect modi…cation can be de…ned with respect to distributions of potential outcomes or with respect to speci…c measures. We can summarize the properties of confounding and e¤ect modi…cation as follows. When de…ned with respect to distribution, neither confounding nor e¤ect modi…cation is scaledependent. When de…ned with respect to measure, both confounding and e¤ect modi…cation are scale-dependent. Both confounding and e¤ect modi…-cation are relative to what other variables are being conditioned upon; however the ways in which confounding and e¤ect modi…cation are relative di¤er. The presence of confounding depends on the manner in which the exposure was assigned; the presence of e¤ect modi…cation does not. Both confounding and e¤ect modi…cation are relative to the population in question. Both confounding and e¤ect modi…cation are relative to the speci…c exposure and outcome under study; a variable is not a confounder or an e¤ect modi…er for a particular exposure, nor simply for a particular outcome, but for the relation between a speci…c exposure and a speci…c outcome. A variable may be an e¤ect modi…er for a speci…c measure without it being a confounder; likewise a variable may be a confounder for a speci…c measure without it being an e¤ect modi…er. A variable can be an e¤ect modi…er in distribution without it being a confounder in distribution. However, a variable cannot be a confounder in distribution without it being e¤ect modi…er in distribution. The purpose of this paper has been primarily conceptual. However, the properties considered and the distinctions drawn have important implications for data analysis. Several points merit attention with regard to e¤ect modi…-cation. First, it has been noted repeatedly that e¤ect modi…cation is relative to the e¤ect measure (Miettinen, 1974; Rothman, 2002; Brumback and Berg, 2008; Rothman et al., 2008) ; one may have e¤ect modi…cation on one scale but not on another. However, this is not the only factor to which e¤ect modi…ca-tion is relative and which must be considered in interpretation. In addition to scale, the conditionality of e¤ect modi…cation on other covariates is important whenever one is interpreting e¤ect modi…cation analyses. Two studies of the same population may report di¤erent conclusions concerning e¤ect modi…ca-tion because di¤erent variables are controlled for in the analysis. A variable may be an e¤ect modi…er because it serves as a proxy for another variable that actually interacts with the exposure of interest; a di¤erent analysis that controlled for this variable that truly interacted with the exposure might then have that the e¤ect of exposure no longer varies across strata of the original e¤ect modi…er (VanderWeele, 2009a; VanderWeele and Robins, 2007; VanderWeele and Knol, 2011) . That e¤ect modi…cation is relative to a population should also be taken into account in the interpretation of e¤ect modi…cation analyses. Two analyses of di¤erent populations that study the same exposure, outcome, e¤ect modi…er and condition on the same covariates may yield dif-ferent conclusions about e¤ect modi…cation. This should not necessarily be taken as indicating that one of the analyses must be wrong; it is possible for there to be e¤ect modi…cation in one population but not in another. The relative nature of e¤ect modi…cation to the scale, to the other covariates in the analysis, and to the population are important to consider when interpreting e¤ect modi…cation analyses.
Our discussion of the properties of confounding is also relevant for data analysis. First, that confounding is relative to the population may be helpful in reducing biases in causal e¤ects. A covariate that is strongly related to the outcome in one population, may be unassociated with the outcome in a second population. Analyses of causal e¤ects may be subject to much less confounding bias in one population than in another. When possible, it may thus be advantageous to undertake observational studies in populations where confounding is thought to be less problematic. Second, as has been previously noted (Miettinen, 1974; Greenland and Robins, 1986; Rothman et al., 2008; Pearl, 2009) , the conditionality of confounding implies that one cannot simply check whether each covariate is unconditionally associated with the exposure and with the outcome (conditional on exposure) in determining whether or not a variable is a confounder. The associations conditional on all other covariates must be considered. Due to the need to consider all associations conditionally, backward selection techniques may be more relevant if reduction in the number of covariates is thought desirable (Robins, 1997; VanderWeele and Shpitser, 2011) ; even then we must consider whether the initial set of covariates suf…ce to control for confounding on substantive grounds. Third, the distinction between confounding in distribution versus measure becomes important when considering "collapsibility" approaches to confounding assessment i.e. in settings in which an investigator evaluates confounding by comparing an adjusted and unadjusted estimate. Greenland et al. (1999) showed that for the risk difference and the risk ratio scales, collapsibility follows from no-confounding and vice versa. However, this implication holds for confounding in measure, not confounding in distribution. One may have collapsibility on the risk di¤erence scale and therefore conclude that a particular variable is not a confounder of the risk di¤erence (conditional on the other covariates); however, this does not imply that the variable is not a confounder for the risk ratio; it might be necessary to make control for that variable in evaluating the risk ratio. Collapsibility of the risk di¤erence implies no confounding in measure for the risk di¤erence; collapsibility of the risk ratio implies no confounding in measure for the risk ratio; however, neither implies no confounding in distribution. One must be careful when changing scales -not only in assessing e¤ect modi…cation -but also when thinking about confounding.
Notions of counterfactuals or potential outcomes from the causal inference provide a formal framework in which to conceptualize causation. The phenomena of confounding and e¤ect modi…cation are concerned respectively with how such causal e¤ects relate to the observed data and how they may vary across strata of other variables. These two phenomenon are distinct but, as has been seen, also intimately related. The concepts and formalizations that have developed from within causal inference literature more clearly shed light on the properties of and the relationships and distinctions between these two important epidemiologic concepts. Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose there is e¤ect modi…cation in distribution then there exist a, q 1 and q 2 such that P (Y a jq 1 ) 6 = P (Y a jq 2 ) so E(Y a jq 1 ) 6 = E(Y a jq 2 ). Let a 0 be some other value of A. Either E(Y a 0 jq 1 ) = E(Y a 0 jq 2 ) or E(Y a 0 jq 1 ) 6 = E(Y a 0 jq 2 ). If E(Y a 0 jq 1 ) = E(Y a 0 jq 2 ) then since E(Y a jq 1 ) 6 = E(Y a jq 2 ) we have that E(Y a jq 1 ) E(Y a 0 jq 1 ) 6 = E(Y a jq 2 ) E(Y a 0 jq 2 ) and thus there is e¤ect modi…cation in the risk di¤erence measure. If, on the other hand, E(Y a jq 1 ) = E(Y a jq 2 ), then either E(Y a jq 1 )=E(Y a 0 jq 1 ) = E(Y a jq 2 )=E(Y a 0 jq 2 ) or E(Y a jq 1 )=E(Y a 0 jq 1 ) 6 = E(Y a jq 2 )=E(Y a 0 jq 2 ). If the latter, then there is effect modi…cation in the risk ratio measure. If the former then E(Y a jq 1 ) E(Y a 0 jq 1 ) = E(Y a jq 1 ) E(Y a jq 1 ) E(Y a 0 jq 2 ) E(Yajq 2 ) = E(Y a jq 1 )f1 E(Y a 0 jq 2 ) E(Yajq 2 ) g 6 = E(Y a jq 2 )f1 E(Y a 0 jq 2 ) E(Yajq 2 ) g = E(Y a jq 2 ) E(Y a 0 jq 2 ) and thus there is e¤ect modi…cation in the risk di¤erence measure. From this it follows that if there is e¤ect modi…cation in distribution then there must be e¤ect modi…cation either for the risk di¤erence or risk ratio measure. The reverse implication follows essentially immediately: if P (Y a jQ = q) does not vary with q then (E(Y 1 jQ = q); E(Y 0 jQ = q)) will not vary with q.
Proof of Proposition 3. Since Y a ? ? Aj(X; C) we have that P (Y a jC = c; X = x) = P (Y jA = a; C = c; X = x). If C is not an e¤ect modi…er in distribution for the e¤ect of A on Y conditional on X then P (Y a jC = c; X = x) does not vary with c. Let c 0 be some speci…c value of C so that P (Y a jC = c; X = x) = P (Y a jC = c 0 ; X = x) for all c. We would then have that where the …rst equality holds by the law of iterated expectations, the second through …fth because P (Y a jC = c; X = x) = P (Y a jC = c 0 ; X = x) for all c, the sixth because Y a ? ? Aj(X; C) and the seventh again by the law of iterated expectations. We have thus shown that if Y a ? ? Aj(X; C) and if C is not an e¤ect modi…er in distribution for the e¤ect of A on Y conditional on X then Y a ? ? AjX. Consequently if Y a ? ? Aj(X; C) but it is not the case that Y a ? ? AjX then C must be an e¤ect modi…er in distribution for the e¤ect of A on Y conditional on X.
Appendix 2. Conditionality of Confounding and E¤ect Modi…cation.
To illustrate the conditionality of confounding and e¤ect modi…cation further, we show that it is always possible to hypothetically construct a single variable E such that there is no further confounding conditional on that variable and that it is also possible to hypothetically construct a variable S such that no other variable serves as an e¤ect modi…er conditional on S. With regard to confounding, if we de…ne E = P (A = 1jY 0 ; Y 1 ) then by the theory of propensity
